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All major exporting countries of agricultural commodities have some form of credit
guarantee program. As the importance of credit programs escalates, it is incumbent
on  policy  makers  to  examine  the  value  of their  program  relative  to  those  of
competitors. In this study, a model based on option pricing theory was developed to
estimate the value  of credit guarantees  extended to importers and applied to U.S.
and competing countries' programs. The Canadian guarantee has the lowest implicit
value, followed by the U.S., Australian, and French guarantees.  French guarantees
had the highest implicit value due to higher coverage  for interest and freight and
insurance.
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Introduction
Credit guarantee programs have become an increasingly important element of export
strategy for agricultural products and are used by all major exporters. However, several
structural changes affect the future use and design of these mechanisms. As a result of
changes in the composition of importers (primarily privatization), inter-country compe-
tition, and the GATT (exporting  countries must limit export programs that provide
visible subsidies), use of export credit guarantee programs has escalated.1
Competition  among  exporting  countries'  programs  makes  it more  important  to
evaluate  the  critical  features  that  enhance  the value  of  credit  guarantees.  In the
primary U.S. export credit program (GSM-102),  credit terms  are standardized  across
importing  countries,  thus  implying  limited  flexibility  when  granting  loans  and
restricting the ability to differentiate guarantee premiums by loan risk. Amstutz and
others  have  appealed  to  the  need  for  greater  flexibility  in  U.S.  credit  guarantee
programs. Industry responses  to the establishment  of the Supplier Credit Guarantee
Program (SCGP) also argued for alternative levels of program coverage, inclusion of
freight in the amount covered  by guarantees,  alternate levels for fee structures,  etc.
[U.S.  Department  of Agriculture/Commodity  Credit  Corporation  (USDA/CCC)].  In
contrast, the French COFACE program provides greater flexibility in credit terms across
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importing countries,  and Canadian programs vary export credit insurance premiums
based on risk.
Understanding  the  factors  that contribute  to the  value  of credit mechanisms  is
important for policy makers and program administrators for a number of reasons. First,
the programs are  designed to add value to recipients.  Second,  an exporting country's
programs  are subjected  to competition  from  similar programs  from other countries.
Third,  the use and interpretation  of credit programs  is an important issue  in World
Trade  Organization  negotiations.  It  is important  that the  U.S.  Commodity  Credit
Corporation is regarded as having similar features as a state trading enterprise (STE)
due primarily to the mechanisms  of the CCC in credit programs (Fegley).2
Previous  research  on  export  credit  guarantee  valuation  has  focused  largely  on
the interest subsidy component of the mechanism. Skully, and Hyberg et al. examined
the  subsidy  value  of GSM guarantees  by  estimating the inherent  interest  subsidy
contained in GSM  guarantees.  The  value of the guarantee  was represented  by  the
interest rate  differential  facing  the  importer  when  borrowing  with  the  guarantee
versus higher alternative  borrowing  costs.  Hyberg et al.  estimated that the implied
interest subsidy incorporated in GSM guarantees  averaged 4%  of the value  of GSM
allocations  for  wheat  exports  from  1979-92.  These  results  illustrate  the potential
magnitude of implicit interest subsidies, but do not account for the guarantee value of
the instrument. In addition, in the U.S.  credit guarantee  programs, interest rates on
guaranteed  loans  are  set  administratively  by  the  USDA  and  do  not  vary  across
importing countries.  Thus, interest rate differentials for guaranteed sales would not
reflect the true risk premium associated with guaranteed over nonguaranteed  sales.
Finally, other program features affect program value-namely insurance, freight, and
exchange rate risk.
Credit guarantees have an option value due to the guarantee feature which can be
evaluated using contingent claims analysis as suggested in the recent literature on real
options (see Amram and Kulatilaka for a summary of applications of option methodology
to nontradable real options).  In this study, we derive the implied value of provisions
embedded in export credit guarantee programs. The model was applied to various export
credit guarantee terms/provisions to examine the value of providing increased flexibility
for both the GSM-102  program and the recent Supplier  Credit Guarantee  Program.
Comparisons  are made to competing countries' programs.
U.S. and Competitor Program Provisions
Most major exporting countries of agricultural commodities extend some form of export
credit guarantee/insurance.  The United States, Canada, Australia, France, and other
countries  in the European Union  (EU) have  export credit  insurance/guarantee  pro-
grams.  The United States has  several export credit programs  operated by the CCC;
however,  most guarantees are extended under the GSM-102  and GSM-103  programs.
2  In a recent paper, Sumner  and Josling describe  the extent  and use of CCC  programs. They indicate that with the
implementation of the Uruguay Round constraints and changes in domestic farm programs, use of the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP) dropped in 1997 to less than 10% of the value of EEP exports that occurred at their peak in 1993, while credit
programs in 1997 remained at over 50% of the value of exports under credit that occurred at their peak in 1992.
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Traditionally,  these programs  guarantee export  sales to importers that are financed
through U.S. banks. If importers default, the CCC reimburses the U.S. bank and takes
ownership of the loan. These programs cover up to 98% of the principal and a portion
of the interest for terms up to three years (GSM-102) and 3-10 years (GSM-103).  The
USDA announces  credit allocations  under these programs  each year by country and
commodity.  Premiums  are  chamirged  to the importer  based  on  the term  of the loan;
however,  imports  from all countries are charged the same rate regardless  of the risk
involved.  No exchange rate guarantee is provided,  and freight and insurance  can be
included only as a response to competing offers.
Most countries offer terms  of one to three years, with some offering shorter and/or
longer terms.3 For example, France and the United States can extend guarantees for up
to 10 years, while some exporters like Malaysia and Ireland will only extendon  up to 180
days. Coverage limits also vary. Most countries offer coverage on 85% to 100% of the
principal and from all to only a portion of the interest paid. In 1993-94, U.S. GSM-102
guarantees covered  interest at the rate  of 2.8%, except for the Former Soviet Union
(FSU) where all interest was covered.4 Generally, most credit guarantee programs have
not required a down payment;  however,  Canada requires  a down payment of 10% to
25%.
Premium rates charged vary both across countries and within programs. The United
States traditionally  charges  a flat fee  to all importing countries.  Other exporters-
notably Canada, Australia, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal-may vary
their premiums based on the creditworthiness of the importing country. Some countries
offer guarantees that include  freight terms,  such as cost and freight (c&f),  and cost,
insurance,  and freight (c.i.f.),  to match competing offers. France includes these terms
when the goods are shipped on French vessels. Although Canada may guarantee  c&f
sales, inclusion of c&f terms reduces the amount of grain that can be purchased under
credit limits.
Interest  subsides  and  exchange  rate  guarantees  are  not  available  from  most
exporters. Canada has the ability to use interest subsidies, but in practice has not used
them for many years.  France offers interest subsidies through Banque Francaise du
Commerce Exterieur (BFCE) and exchange rate guarantees. The United States does not
extend interest subsidies or exchange rate guarantees for agricultural products through
GSM-102,  GSM-103, or the Eximbank.
Credit programs continue to be responsive to market and competitive conditions. In
1995, Canada, which had previously focused on sovereign sales, changed provisions of
its program allowing loans to nonsovereign buyers to a maximum of $CAN  1.0 billion.
The United States announced  an adjustable interest rate for GSM-102  and GSM-103
programs in 1995. Rates for GSM-102 and GSM-103 are not to exceed 55% and 80%,
respectively, of the most recent 52-week Treasury bill auction prior to the date rates are
adjusted.  In July  1995,  the  United  States  proposed  rules  for  a  new program,  the
Supplier  Credit Guarantee  Program (SCGP).  The  SCGP provides  short-term  credit
directly to importers for terms up to 180 days. No foreign letter of credit is required, but
instead,  a form of promissory note or  contract between  the importer  and  exporter.
3See Dahl et al. for a summary of competitor programs.
4 Guarantees to the FSU were changed in 1991 to cover  100% of the principal and interest at the prevailing rate for  52-
week Treasury bills.
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Coverage limits are projected  to cover 50%  of the port value and provide no interest
coverage.  Guarantee fees are set at $0.95 per $100 of coverage.
Analytical Model to Value Export
Credit Programs
Previous Studies
Valuation of guarantees has received more attention in the past few years due in part
to advances in option valuation models. Contingent claims analysis using option pricing
theory provides a useful analytical model to value guarantees. Previous research using
option pricing to value guarantees  has focused on several specific  areas. Most of the
work  done  initially  was  applied  to  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC)
insurance guarantees (Merton) and federal guarantees (Jones; Sosin) for large corporate
loans (e.g., Chrysler, Massey Ferguson, the steel industry). Recent work has focused on
valuing changes  in federal deposit insurance  programs (Flood; Pennacchi;  Ronn and
Verma) and FmHA and state guarantees of farm loans (Sherrick).
Valuation of options on foreign exchange has been examined extensively (Garman and
Kohlhagen; Grabbe; Ritchken; Shastri and Tandon). However, option valuation models
for foreign currency depend  on whether  the options are  on spot or futures  exchange
rates. Garman a  nd Kohlhagen, and Grabbe argued that using the Black-Scholes model
to value options on foreign currency exchange was incorrect. Models on foreign currency
exchange  must include  expectations  about  interest  rates  in  both  countries.  Since
expectations about interest rates in both countries are incorporated into the price of the
futures contract, formulation of an option valuation model based on futures results in
a model similar to the Black-Scholes  model.
Valuing Export Credit Guarantees
A model was developed in this study to estimate the value of export credit guarantees
extended to importers, to value the effects of flexibility, and to make comparisons across
exporting countries' programs.  Valuation  of guarantees  within an option framework
allows for inclusion of individual components of guarantee programs and is consistent
with the structure of actual payoffs incurred by the CCC under export credit guarantee
programs.  Credit programs offered by exporters entail several forms of guarantees to
buyers' and exporters' banks. As such, these can be viewed as having implicit option
values.  Thus,  the analytical  goal is to derive  implicit  values  associated  with  these
guarantees.
Valuation  of government  guarantees  for  bank deposits  or  corporate  liabilities  is
equivalent to the limited liability of a common stock put option (Merton). Traditionally,
credit guarantees exhibit a similar form of limited liability. At maturity,  if the value
of the  credit instrument  guaranteed  is low,  the  guarantee  has  a positive  value  to
the holder of the guarantee.  As the value of the credit instrument being guaranteed
increases, the value of the guarantee to the holder diminishes. Losses incurred from the
purchase  of the  guarantee  by the  holder  are limited  to  the premium  paid  for  the
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guarantee.  Similarly, as the value of the credit instrument guaranteed increases, the
value of the guarantee to the writer (e.g.,  CCC) increases. When the value of the credit
instrument that is guaranteed exceeds its face value, the writer's value of the guarantee
is limited to the value of any premium paid by the holder.
The Black-Scholes  option model was used for estimating the value of export credit
guarantees.  This model provides  an estimate of an actuarially fair premium that an
insured (importer/U.S. bank) would pay for this insurance/guarantee.  Credit guarantees
are valued as
(1)  G(T)  = Be -rT(x 2)  - V4I(xl),
where
G is the fair market value of the loan guarantee,
T is the term of the loan guarantee,
B is the strike or guarantee price,
e is the transcendental number 2.71828  ... ,
r is the market rate of interest,
V is the current value of the asset,
4(.) is the cumulative normal density function,
xl = {ln(B/V)  - (r + o2/2)T }/ oT,
x2 = xl + o/T, and
o2 is the instantaneous volatility of the market value of the asset (V).
Greater  flexibility in the terms of the credit guarantee involves changing coverage
levels, adding coverage  for freight and insurance, and  e,  d adding an exchange rate guar-
antee. Flood noted that different coverage levels can be viewed as compound or multiple
options  written  on the bank's  assets where  deposits  are  held.  In  the case  of credit
guarantees extended by the CCC, the principal covered coud be represented implicitly
by an option written by the CCC and held by the U.S. bank. The uncovered portion does
not affect the value of the CCC guarantee.  It  represents an option written by stock-
holders and depositors of the exporting bank on the value of the bank's assets (including
the letter of credit from the importer) and held by the exporting bank's stockholders.
In this study, we are concerned primarily with the valuation of guarantees extended
by the CCC and competitor countries. Consequently, valuing the variability in the per-
centage of principal covered can be modeled by simply increasing or decreasing the total
value of the loan that is guaranteed per metric ton exported  (the strike price of the
option). Valuing coverage for freight and insurance may be treated analogously from the
perspective  of the CCC and can be incorporated  by adding these costs to the per unit
value  of the amount  guaranteed.  The  guarantee  also can  be examined  from  other
perspectives including those of the participating bank and the importer. These different
perspectives would necessitate different value formulations comprising multiple options.
An exchange rate guarantee adds the equivalent of a second guarantee onto the basic
export credit guarantee. A second option representing an option on the foreign currency
exchange for the loan value was developed for estimating the fair market value of this
feature. A general model for valuation of put options on foreign currency exchange based
on spot rates (Ritchken) is specified as
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(2)  P(X)  = Xe rT(D-d2)  - Se -rT(  -dl),
where
P(X) is the value of the exchange rate guarantee,
X is the strike price,
So is the spot rate,
o2is the instantaneous volatility of the spot rate,
r is the risk-free rate for currency  1,
r* is the risk-free rate for currency 2,
d, = {ln(So/X)  + (r - r* + o2/2)T}/o/T, and
d2 = dl - ovT.
The total value of a credit guarantee with coverage  for exchange rate risk is equal
to the sum of the two separate option values where applicable  [i.e., TG =  G(T) + P(X),
where TG is the value of the total guarantee].  This does not consider variable inter-
actions affecting each of the option valuations. Tregeorgis reports that for real options,
values are more likely additive if options are of opposite types, exercise times are close
together for both options, and the options are further out of the money. Since exercise
times  should  be  equivalent,  assuming  additive  option values  should  provide  outer
bounds for the changes examined. Further, interactions of variables that affect both the
guarantee  and exchange rate portions of the total value of the credit guarantee would
tend to reinforce each other.
Valuation  models for three periods were developed to represent the annual install-
ments (n) required under GSM guarantees  (Harris; Dahl et al.).  Therefore, the total
value of the guarantee is
n
(3)  TG  =  TGt.
t=1
Option values derived from the three periods were summed to arrive at the total value
of the credit guarantee. Similar simulations were made for competing country programs
to represent installments for each.
Representative Importing Country Parameters
Model parameters for the base case were taken to be representative of a typical import-
ing country  using  credit.  Simulations  of critical  model parameters  were  conducted
to  evaluate  the  sensitivity  of the  option  values  to  changes  in assumptions.  Those
parameters in the base case are representative of  Pakistan which has been an important
recipient of credit for wheat.5 Factors affecting the option value of the guarantees would
6 Indeed, Pakistan has been the largest importer of wheat under credit in a number of years during the  1990s, and was
the source of recent issue in credit administration.  Specifically, during the fall of 1998, Pakistan was suspended from the
GSM-102  credit program after falling behind in payments,  but was reinstated as  a credit recipient in early  1999.
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Table 1.  Initial Parameters for Option Valuation of GSM Guarantees
Item  Units  Value
FOB value of exports  $/metric ton  156.78
Freight and insurance  $/metric ton  26.00
GSM interest rate (LIBOR + 25)  %  6.875
Risk-free interest rate, importer  %  13.05
Percent of principal covered  %  98.00
Percent of interest covered  % basis points  2.8
Down payment  %  0.0
Current value of letter of credit  $/1,000  903.125
Volatility of letter of credit  standard deviation  0.30
Current value of exchange rate  local currency/dollar  24.58
Volatility of exchange  rate  standard deviation  0.042
Term  years  3
be unique to every country and would depend on a multitude of factors. To fully under-
stand and explore the effects of credit guarantee specifications, the effects of program
provisions including down payment and coverage levels, interest rates, value, and vola-
tility of the value of the underlying security (letter of credit) were simulated.
Data required for estimation of the value of export credit guarantees were gathered
from several sources.  FOB and freight and insurance values were taken from Landes
and Ash. Exchange and interest rates [London Interbank offer rates (LIBOR) and local
lending rates] were derived from the International Monetary Fund. Forfaiting rates6
were obtained from various issues of International  Trade Finance.
Data used for the initial parameter values are shown in table 1. Principal and interest
coverage, down payments, and the term of the guarantee represent provisions for GSM
programs (Dahl et al.). Interest rates for the GSM program were at 25 basis points over
the London Interbank offer rates (LIBOR) (Skully; Hyberg et al.). The market value of
letters of credit by country was estimated by applying the discount indicated by current
forfaiting rates to a base ($1,000) letter of credit. Due to the unavailability of historical
data on the value of importers' letters of credit, an initial value of 0.3 was used for the
volatility (typical of recent values based on observations and discussions with industry
participants), and sensitivities of model results were examined for a range of volatilities
to determine their effect on option values. The annualized exchange rate volatility for
the base country was estimated from monthly observations of exchange rates over the
three-year period  1991-93.  These provide a reasonable  set of initial parameters  for
valuing credit guarantee programs and making comparisons across competing exporters'
mechanisms.  In addition, and where relevant, sensitivities were conducted from these
base values.
6 Forfaiting  is an export trade financing  mechanism  that trades  properly executed  and documented  debt obligations
obtained directly from exporters (can be letters of credit). Forfaiting rates are the discount applied to the future flow of funds
and reflect the forfaiter's cost of funds and a premium.  An explanation and current examples  of rates are available online
from Benning Bassett.
512  December 1999Export Credit Guarantees  513
Table 2.  Value of Credit Guarantees, by Type of Coverage
Change from Base
Option Value  Value  Percent
Guarantee  ($/mt)  ($/mt)  (%)
Base Case  23.15
Base Case + Freight  27.27  4.12  17.8
Base Case + Exchange  23.69  0.53  2.3
Base Case + Freight + Exchange  27.90  4.74  20.5
Results
Base Model
Values of credit guarantees were estimated using provisions in place for GSM-102  in
fiscal year 1994. Premiums ranged from .16% to .67% of the value of exports depending
on the term of the guarantee. Coverages for freight, insurance, and exchange rates were
not included in the initial valuation.
Results from the base case and alternative packages of features are shown in table 2.
The value of GSM credit guarantees extended to the base country was $23.15 per metric
ton (mt), or 14.8% of the export value. Adding freight and insurance coverage increases
the value of GSM credit guarantees by $4.12 per mt. Adding an exchange rate guarantee
to either the base case or the case with freight and insurance increases  the value  of
credit  guarantees  to  $23.69 per  mt and  $27.90  per mt,  respectively.  These  results
suggest that adding freight coverage would have the greatest impact on the value of
credit guarantees. An exchange guarantee adds minimal additional value to the GSM
guarantee.
Sensitivity Analysis
Initial parameters were varied to examine the sensitivity of the value of GSM guaran-
tees to changes in conditions and program provisions. Changes included the value of the
letter of credit guaranteed,  volatility of the value  of the letter of credit,  FOB  export
value, down payment level, percentage of principal and interest covered, length of term
of the guarantee, adding coverage for freight and insurance,  and adding an exchange
rate guarantee. Results are summarized in table 3.
Changes in Default Risk
An important parameter affecting the value of a credit guarantee is the default risk of
the importer. This is reflected in both the price level of the underlying asset (value of the
letter of credit)  and volatility. Importers  with greater default risk would have larger
volatilities in the value of the letter of credit and/or lower price levels.
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Table 3.  Option Value  Sensitivity for Export Credit Guarantee to Percent-
age Changes  in Base Parameters ($/mt)
Change  Value of  Volatility  Value of  Value of  Value of
in Base  Letter  of Letter  GSM  Foreign  Freight &
Value  of Credit  of Credit  Interest  Interest  Shipping
Base Case:
-30%  48.03  16.32  26.70  23.15  23.15
-20%  38.18  18.60  25.47  23.15  23.15
-10%  29.90  20.88  24.29  23.15  23.15
0%  23.15  23.15  23.15  23.15  23.15
10%  16.19  25.41  22.06  23.15  23.15
20%  12.26  27.67  21.01  23.15  23.15
30%  9.28  29.91  20.00  23.15  23.15
Base + Freight and Shipping:
-30%  56.41  19.29  31.44  27.27  26.04
-20%  44.89  21.96  30.00  27.27  26.45
- 10%  35.18  24.62  28.61  27.27  26.86
0%  27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27  27.27
10%  21.00  29.92  25.99  27.27  27.69
20%  16.11  32.54  24.75  27.27  28.10
30%  12.36  35.16  23.57  27.27  28.51
Base + Exchange Rate Guarantee:
-30%  48.57  16.85  26.87  25.86  23.69
-20%  38.71  19.13  25.73  24.94  23.69
-10%  30.43  21.41  24.66  24.17  23.69
0%  23.69  23.69  23.69  23.69  23.69
10%  18.34  25.95  22.81  23.42  23.69
20%  14.19  28.20  22.06  23.28  23.69
30%  11.00  30.44  21.42  23.21  23.69
Base + Freight,  Shipping, and Exchange Rate Guarantee:
-30%  57.03  19.92  31.64  30.44  26.63
-20%  45.51  22.58  30.29  29.35  27.05
- 10%  35.81  25.24  29.04  28.46  27.48
0%  27.90  27.90  27.90  27.90  27.90
10%  21.62  30.54  26.87  27.58  28.32
20%  16.73  33.17  25.98  27.42  28.74
30%  12.98  35.78  25.23  27.34  29.16
a Since no down payment was required  in the base  case, values  for sensitivity  of down payments were
evaluated as actual percentage  down payment required.
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Table 3.  Extended
Percent of  Percentage  Percent  Term  Volatility
Principal  Points  Down  of Credit  of Exchange
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As the price level for the underlying asset decreases, the value of the credit guarantee
increases  at an increasing rate. As an example, the value of a GSM credit guarantee
would be $29.90 for a country whose letter of credit has a current value of $812 (10%
less than the base case). For a higher risk country whose letter of credit is only worth
$631  (30%  less than the base  case), due to a higher potential that loans will not be
repaid because of political instability, threat of nationalization of industries, occurrence
of wars,  etc.,  or because  of  a higher  financial  risk  of default  by  the importer,  the
importer's bank, and/or the importing country, the value of the GSM guarantee would
be $48.03.
There is a positive relationship between the volatility of the letter of credit and the
value of the GSM guarantee (figure 1). In the base case, the volatility was 0.3. and the
value of the guarantee was $23.15/mt. For a country whose risk was greater (volatility
was 30% greater), the value of the guarantee increased to $29.91/mt.  Thus, countries
with higher default risk would have a greater value of the guarantee implied in the
GSM program.  Changes in either the volatility  or price level of the letter of credit,
within the range examined, have a dramatic impact on the value of credit guarantees.
Adding  coverage  for  freight  and  insurance  to the  base  guarantee  increases  the
sensitivity of the value  of the guarantee  to changes  in default  risk.  As default risk
increases,  the value  of the guarantee  including  coverage  for freight  and insurance
increases  at  a faster rate  than the base  guarantee.  However,  if an exchange  rate
guarantee is added to the base guarantee, changes in the default risk for the importers
have no effect on the value of the exchange rate guarantee.  Therefore, unlike adding
coverage  for  freight  and  insurance,  adding  an  exchange  rate  guarantee  does  not
increase or decrease the sensitivity  of the total value of the guarantee  to changes in
default risk.
Down Payment, Principal, and Interest Covered
The model was simulated to evaluate effects of changes in these variables on the value
of the GSM guarantee. Increasing the down payment as a percentage of the FOB value
required for GSM guarantees  reduces the value of guarantees.  In the base case, the
GSM guarantee has no down payment  and has a value of $23.15/mt.  Increasing the
down payment to 10% or reducing the percentage  of the principal covered  by a GSM
credit guarantee by 10% reduces the value of  the guarantee to $15.42/mt and $15.56/mt,
respectively.  These results illustrate  that changes  in the principal  covered  or down
payments  required for credit guarantees  can have significant impacts on the value of
credit guarantees.
The U.S.  GSM guarantees  the payment of interest accrued at a specified rate,  or
percentage points of interest, unlike other exporters. Changes in the percentage points
of interest covered have limited impact on the value of credit guarantees. Increasing the
percentage points of interest covered by 30% (from 2.8% to 3.64%) increases the value
of guarantees to $24.45 per mt.
Changing the term of the guarantee also has limited impact. Lengthening the term
of the loan from the initial three-year guarantee increased the value of credit guaran-
tees (basic, with freight, and with exchange rate guarantees). An increase of 30% in the
term of the loan increased the value of the basis loan guarantee by $0.74.
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Figure 1. Value of GSM guarantee and components,  by volatility
of the value of the letter of credit
Effects of Lending Interest Rates on Credit
Guarantee Value
The interest rate charged  by lenders  for loans guaranteed  by GSM  and the spread
between this rate and the alternative  cost of money in the  e importing  country have
interesting effects on the value of credit guarantees (figures 2 and 3). A change in the
interest rate charged for loans guaranteed by GSM affects the value of the basic guar-
antee. However, changes in the interest rate spread do not. For example, increasing the
interest rate charged by banks on guaranteed loans from 6% to 7% decreases the value
of the basic guarantee  from  $24.61/mt to $22.95/mt  (figure 2), while  increasing the
importer's interest rate, which increases the interest rate spread, has no effect on the
value of the base guarantee (figure 3).
Changes  in the  interest  rate  spread  due  to either  changes  in rates  charged  on
guaranteed loans or alternative interest rates did affect the value of a guarantee that
includes  coverage for exchange rates. For example, in the base case with an exchange
rate guarantee, the interest rate charged by banks for the guaranteed loan is 6.875%
and the alternative cost of borrowing in the importing country is 13.05%, resulting in
an interest rate  spread  of 6.175%.  As the  interest  rate on  the guaranteed  loan  is
increased to  13.05%, the spread between interest rates declines  and the value of the
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Figure 2.  Value of GSM guarantee and components,  by GSM
interest rate
guarantee increases under an exchange rate guarantee (figure 2). Beyond 13.05%, the
interest spread becomes negative and the value of the guarantee with the exchange rate
coverage declines. Similarly, as the importer's alternative cost of borrowing declines to
6.875%,  the  spread  in interest  rates  declines  and  the value  of the  exchange  rate
guarantee increases.  Below 6.875%, the spread becomes negative and the value of the
exchange rate guarantee declines.
Exchange Rate Guarantee Parameters
Both the level and volatility  of the exchange  rate have an effect  on the value  of the
credit guarantee. The effect of an exchange rate guarantee on the credit guarantee value
was evaluated "at the money." As the current value of the exchange rate decreases from
the guaranteed exchange rate, the value of extending a credit guarantee with exchange
rate coverage increases dramatically. In this case, a 20% decrease in the current value
of the exchange rate would more than double the value of the credit guarantee. Like-
wise, increasing the exchange rate volatility produces a similar increase in the value of
extending an exchange rate guarantee.
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Figure 3.  Value of GSM guarantee and components,  by importer
interest rate
Supplier Credit  Guarantee  Program
The model was also used to analyze the option value of the SCGP. Differences in model
parameters  between the base model and the SCGP model were  (a) a reduction in the
value covered from 95% to 50% of the export value, (b) a shorter term (0.5 year versus
three years), and (c) no coverage for interest. The basic SCGP had a value of $0.01 per
mt in comparison to the GSM at $23.15. The main reasons for the lower value of SCGP
than GSM-102  guarantees are the shorter term and the lower  coverage levels which
result in options that are far out of the money.
Sensitivities of the value of the basic SCGP program to changes in parameters were
examined  for  the  value  of the  promissory  note,  volatility  of the  promissory  note,
percentage of principal coverage, term, interest rate, and interest coverage (table 4). The
value of the basic SCGP program was most sensitive to the value of the promissory note,
as in the GSM-102  guarantee.  A  10%  decrease  in the value of the promissory note
increases  the  value  of the  guarantee  by  $0.04/mt.  However,  unlike  the  GSM-102
program, changes  in the volatility of the promissory note have a lesser impact on the
value of the SCGP credit than the amount of principal coverage.  A 30% increase in the
percentage of principal covered (50% to 65%) increased the value of the SCGP guarantee
by $0.43/mt ($0.01 versus $0.44). Increasing the volatility of the promissory note by 30%
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Table 4.  Sensitivity  of Option Value for SCGP Program to Percentage
Changes  in  Base Parameters ($/mt)
Change  Value of  Volatility of  Term  Percent
in Base  Promissory  Promissory  Principal  of Credit  SCGP  Interest
Value  Note  Note  Coverage  Guarantee  Interest  Coverage
-30%  0.89  0.000  0.0000  0.001  0.012
-20%  0.22  0.001  0.0001  0.003  0.011
-10%  0.05  0.003  0.001  0.005  0.010
0%  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.010  0.010  0.010
10%  0.001  0.03  0.05  0.015  0.009  0.011
20%  0.003  0.06  0.16  0.023  0.009  0.011
30%  0.000  0.11  0.44  0.033  0.008  0.012
a10% interest coverage reflects  10% of interest cost covered.
only increased the value of the guarantee to $0.11/mt. Changes in other parameters had
lesser impacts on the value of the SCGP guarantee.
Comparisons  Among Competing Countries'  Programs
Credit terms vary across competing  exporters  and have an important effect  on their
value. The model was used to determine the value of each program. This comparison
provides insight into the relative value to the importer implied in each of the exporting
countries'  guarantee  programs.  Programs  for the  four major wheat  exporters  were
examined  (Canada,  Australia,  France,  and  the  United  States).  Importing  country
parameter characteristics equivalent to those in the previous analysis were assumed.
Shipping  costs  were  assumed  equal  for each  exporting  country  to provide  a direct
comparison.
Individual parameters for each of the major exporting countries' programs are shown
in table 5 and denominated in local currency. The most important differences among the
programs are reflected in principal and interest coverage and the percentage of down
payment  required.  However,  the  France-COFACE  program  also  covers  freight  and
insurance.
Comparison  results are  shown in table  6.  The  credit  guarantee  provided  by the
Canadian Wheat Board had the lowest value ($12.55/mt), followed by the United States
($22.61/mt), Australia  ($26.95/mt),  and France-COFACE  ($38.55/mt).  The  Canadian
guarantee had the lowest value primarily because of the large down payment required
on guaranteed sales. The values of the U.S. and Australian guarantees are similar, with
differences in values between the two programs being largely due to different coverage
levels for principal and interest. The French-COFACE guarantee had the highest value
primarily because the COFACE guarantee includes coverage for freight and shipping.
Moreover, the COFACE guarantee can also include an exchange rate guarantee, adding
further value to the guarantee for the importer. In this case, that value is an additional
$4.98/mt.
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Table 5.  Initial Parameters for Comparisons of Export Credit Programs for
Major Exporters
Item  Units  U.S.  Canada  France  Australia
Value of exports for coverage  export currency/mt  156.78  184.56  1,007.17  118.07
Guarantee interest rate  %  6.875  6.625  6.625  6.625
Risk-free interest rate, importer  %  13.05  13.05  13.05  13.05
Percent of principal coverage  %  98  100  95  100
Percent basis points, interest covered  %  basis points  2.8
Percent of interest coverage  %  basis points  - 100  95  75
Down payment  %  0  25  0  0
Current value, $1,000 letter of credit  export currency  903.125  1,063  4,976  680
Volatility of letter of credit  std. deviation  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.30
Current value of exchange rate  import currency/  24.58  21.58  4.62  32.02
export currency
Exchange rate volatility  std. deviation  0.042  0.054  0.094  0.069
Term  years  3  3  3  3
Table  6.  Value  of Export Credit Guarantees for Major Wheat  Exporters
(US$/mt)
Letter of Credit
Basic  Exchange Rate
Country  Guarantee  (if offered)  $1,000  $500
Canada (Canadian Wheat Board)  12.55  - 9.58  38.26
Australia  26.95  -21.76  63.41
U.S.  22.61  -18.01  56.44
France-COFACE  a  38.55  4.98  31.96  80.50
Note: Term periods for U.S., Canada, and France = three annual installments; Australia  = six semiannual
installments.
a Includes coverage for freight and shipping.
The sensitivity of valuations of the export credit programs for the major exporters to
changes  in related parameters was examined.  As the current value of the importer's
letter of credit declines  (increase in potential default), the values of the export credit
programs for each of the major exporters increase. The ranking of values for the export
credit guarantee programs (lowest to highest value) remains the same, but the spread
among values for individual exporters' programs becomes wider (table 6). These results
illustrate that the advantages of the French (COFACE) guarantee increase for riskier
importing countries.  Similar  conclusions  can be  made  as the  probability  of default
increases. Specifically,  the credit guarantee  provided by France  (COFACE)  becomes
more valuable in comparison to other exporters' programs.
Dahl, Wilson, and GustafsonJournal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
Conclusions  and Policy Implications
Use of credit guarantee programs for the export of agricultural commodities has esca-
lated in importance since the early 1980s. In this study, a methodology to value export
credit guarantees  was  developed.  This  methodology  was  applied  to  various  export
credit guarantee terms and provisions including the new SCGP program to examine the
value of providing increased flexibility.  Comparisons were also made with competing
countries' programs.
The value of the basic GSM credit guarantee was most sensitive to the current price
level, volatility of the importer's letter of credit (assets guaranteed), down payment, and
percentage  of  principal  covered.  Adding  an exchange  rate  guarantee  to  the  GSM
program generally increased the value of the guarantee minimally ($0.54 per mt). In
addition, the value of credit guarantees with an exchange rate guarantee was highly
sensitive to the current value, strike price, and volatility of exchange rates. This indi-
cates that the value of a credit guarantee extended to an importer is heavily influenced
by the default probability and the amount covered.
Adding coverage for freight and insurance increased the value of a credit guarantee
in our base case by $4.12 per mt. Changes in interest coverage and terms for the GSM
program  result  in equal  or  smaller  changes  in the value  of extending  guarantees.
Increasing GSM interest coverage by 30% (to 3.64%) increases  the value of the base
guarantee  by $1.30/mt, while decreases in the interest rate spread between the GSM
rate  and  the  importer's  alternative  rate  increased  the  value  of an  exchange  rate
guarantee.  Therefre, introducing flexibility  by modification  of terms, adjusting the
percentage of coverage, and inclusion of freight and insurance affect the value of export
credit guarantees. These effects are important if the CCC is actively trying to reduce
default exposure. However, these values are evaluated from the perspective of the CCC.
Valuation of changes in these parameters when viewed by the administering banks and
importers may affect the success/failue of the implementation of any of these changes.
The option value implied in the new SCGP credit program was lower than the GSM-
102 program primarily due to the low coverage levels and a shorter term. It was also
less sensitive to changes in the volatility of the underlying asset (promissory note) than
the GSM-102 program.
Comparisons of the value of export credit guarantees implied in programs offered by
Canada, Australia, France, and the United States reveal important differences.  The
Canadian program had the lowest value; the French-COFACE program had the highest.
The  Canadian  anprogram  had  the lowest  value  primarily  due  to  the  down  payment
requirement. The French program had the highest value because it covers freight and
insurance and it covers more of the interest. This relationship holds for a wide range of
values for the price level and volatility of the importer's letter of credit. Further, the
spread between  valuations  of individual  exporters' programs  widens  as the  default
potential increases, giving a greater value to the French-COFACE program.
With typical premiums for credit guarantees (at .15% to .67% of the FOB value), the
value of export credit guarantees exceeds income received from premiums. This should
be interpreted as the implicit subsidy embedded in export credit guarantee programs.
This is not surprising. In fact, Funatsu, who examined extending insurance guarantees
for Eximbank  loans, suggests that underpricing  or charging  very low premiums  for
insurance coverage  may be optimal behavior if the objective is to maximize exports.
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Hyberg et al. estimated the implicit interest subsidy in GSM guarantees for wheat
to all countries at 4%. To be comparable, our estimate of the fair market value of the
guarantee would have to be reduced by the amount of premiums paid and aggregated
across countries. Dahl et al. measured implicit interest subsidies for selected countries,
and report a range from  .89% to 12.43%  of the value of imports. Our estimate for the
base  case is on  the high side of this range  (14.77%  - .67%  =  14.1%).  These results
suggest  that by incorporating  the option value,  the implicit value  of the subsidy  is
substantially greater than previously envisioned.
These results are dependent  on the initial parameters  specified.  One of the major
problems associated  with option valuation of guarantees  is in obtaining the current
value of the assets being guaranteed. Since daily observations for the current value of
letters of credit are not readily observable,  volatilities cannot be empirically derived,
and thus must be assumed based on industry discussions and insight.  Consequently,
this methodology may be more appropriate for use as a ranking tool or as a decision aid
when determining where to allocate a given amount of guarantees over a cross-section
of countries/banks. Further empirical research is also required to determine distribu-
tions for the current value of assets.
[Received July 1998; final revision received  May 1999.]
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